

NOTE: Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200150012-2

In a discussion with Bowie on the attached, 1 Aug 78:

1. It was agreed that John would provide one or two background papers related to his items 1 & 2;
2. That his item 3 would be the major focus of the discussion at the dinner;
3. And that we should try for about 4 outsiders (Bowie suggested approaching 6 in hopes of getting the 4 we want).
4. It was also agreed that John and I would discuss further how the subject is to be handled and who should be invited from inside before going back to Bowie with the proposal (and the reading)

After the meeting I said to [ ] that I'd like to have a tentative proposal to show to Turner, to determine whether it is sufficiently "high level" for him, before we start inviting people to come.

STAT

4 Aug. John will explore possibilities for late August.  
Pratt reading is no good prospects before late Sept.

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*Mr. King*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center  
FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations and External  
Analytical Support  
SUBJECT : DCI Discussion/Dinner Subject: The Soviet Science  
and Technology Lag.

1. The attached memo from [ ] addresses the subject STAT  
you have urged me to develop for a DCI Discussion/Dinner. I  
imagine you will wish to refine it a bit. May I suggest that you  
set aside a half-hour sometime soon when we can discuss it with  
STAT [ ] and anyone else you might wish to include.

2. The last DCI Discussion/Dinner was on 31 May, so we  
are due to have another any time that a suitable date can be  
negotiated.

3. My next prospective subject has to do with Arms Control  
Verification, which Sid Greybeal wishes to develop and present  
himself. It is a bit further down the pike.



STAT

CC: Sayre Stevens

SUBJECT: DCI Discussion/Dinner Subject: The Soviet Science  
and Technology Lag

Distribution:

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3 - NFAC/CAR

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NFAC/CAR  28 July 1978

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**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

NFAC #3143-78  
27 July 1978

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director for National Foreign Assessment Center

VIA : Coordinator for Academic Relations and External  
Analytical Support  
National Intelligence Officer for Special Studies))

FROM : [REDACTED]  
Assistant NIO for Special Studies  
(Science and Technology)

SUBJECT : Proposed Topic for DCI Dinner Discussion

1. This is in response to a request by [REDACTED] that I suggest a topic for discussion at a DCI dinner in the near future. I believe an examination of the following paradox would be very useful: Why massive and continuing Soviet investment in science and technology for over 60 years has not produced, with a few notable exceptions, a commensurate, "cost-effective" payoff, and has forced the Soviets twice within their system's lifetime to turn to the West for help? Such a discussion would not only be useful but most timely, given the current and proposed US actions in canceling or deferring some of the technology sales and scientific exchanges with the USSR.

2. My suggestion is based on the following background. Science and technology are key US assets in our interaction with the USSR. (In fact, next to our strategic deterrent, they are the most important.) I believe these assets have been severely undervalued in their importance to the Soviets by many in the US, though not by the Soviets themselves. I base this judgment on over five years experience (prior to my joining the CIA this spring) in implementing the 1972 US-USSR science and technology agreement--the umbrella agreement of the 11 US-Soviet bilaterals signed at the time [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In that position, I had to deal with both US government agency coordination efforts and with the Soviet S&T hierarchy and working levels of the Soviet S&T community. Our underestimation arose in part from limited appreciation of S&T in general, limited experience in dealing with and knowledge of the Soviets and the frequent rotations of US officials handling S&T matters, resulting in "institutional memory" lapses and frequently unproductive interactions.

E2, IMPDET CL BY [REDACTED]

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3. Against the foregoing US policy background, the discussions might focus on such questions as:

a. What historical/cultural, systemic, and organizational factors have affected Soviet S&T performance?

b. To what extent have these factors been responsible for the following paradox: USSR's gigantic investment in S&T producing the largest S&T community in the world, but leaving it lagging behind the US in most S&T areas?

c. Within this paradoxical situation, why is the Soviet military S&T performance relatively better than the civilian?

d. Can the Soviet S&T community, as a key member of the Soviet system (along with the Party, the military, and government bureaucracy), affect Soviet policy objectives?

e. Would a drastic US slowdown or cutoff of technology sales and scientific exchanges impact on Soviet internal and foreign policy and developments, such as long-term Soviet economic and scientific growth, military capabilities, and human rights?

4. A discussion around the foregoing questions would be highly relevant to the intelligence community's task to provide assessments of the current state of Soviet science and technology, our estimates of future capabilities to support Soviet objectives at home and abroad, and of the effect on the USSR of US use of its S&T as leverage.

5. I would suggest that prominent US scientists and technologists from academia or industry, with extensive experience in dealing with the Soviets, be invited to address the issues noted above; as appropriate and necessary, I would volunteer to comment or make additional substantive points in order to stimulate discussion at the dinner.

6. Among possible outside participants I recommend the following: Dr. Eugene Fubini, chairman of the Defense Department's Science Board and a former member of the Joint US-Soviet Commission on Science and Technology; Dr. Betsy Ancker-Johnson, Associate Director of the Argonne National Laboratories, formerly Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology and US member of the Joint Commission; Dr. Herbert Fusfeld, Director of Research of the Kennecott Corporation, past president of the Industrial Research Institute (a professional organization of US industry research directors) and a current US member of the Joint Commission.

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